The Teicher Affidavit: Iraqgate
Following is the sworn court declaration of former NSC official Howard
Teicher, dated 1/31/95,
regarding 'Iraqgate.' The document is currently under seal by the US District Court,
Southern District of Florida. The original document bears Teicher's dated signature.
UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case
No.:
93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH
CARLOS CARDOEN,
FRANCO SAFTA,
JORGE BURR,
INDUSTRIAS CARDOEN LIMITADA, DECLARATION OF
a/k/a INCAR, HOWARD TEICHER
SWISSCO MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.
EDWARD A. JOHNSON
RONALD W. GRIFFIN, and
TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC.,
d/b/a,
TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY,
)
Defendents.
_____________________________________________
I. Howard Teicher, hereby state that, to the best of my knowledge
and belief, the facts presented herein are true, correct and complete. I
further state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, nothing stated
in this Declaration constitutes classified information.
1. My name is Howard Teicher. From 1977 to 1987, I served in the
United States government as a member of the national security bureaucracy.
>From early 1982 to 1987, I served as a Staff Member to the United States
National Security Council.
2. While a Staff Member to the National Security Council, I was
responsible for the Middle East and for Political-Military Affairs.
During my five year tenure on the National security Council, I had
regular contact with both CIA Director William Casey and Deputy Director
Robert Gates.
3. In the Spring of 1982, Iraq teetered on the brink of losing its
war with Iran. In May and June, 1982, the Iranians discovered a gap in
the Iraqi defenses along the Iran-Iraq border between Baghdad to the north
and Basra to the south. Iran positioned a massive invasion force directly
across from the gap in the Iraqi defenses. An Iranian breakthrough at the
spot would have cutoff Baghdad from Basra and would have resulted in
Iraq's defeat.
4. United States Intelligence, including satellite imagery, had
detected both the gap in the Iraqi defenses and the Iranian massing of
troops across from the gap. At the time, the United States was officially
neutral in the Iran-Iraq conflict.
5. President Reagan was forced to choose between (a) maintaining
strict neutrality and allowing Iran to defeat Iraq, or (b) intervening and
providing assistance to Iraq.
6. In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States
could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan
decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal
to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized
this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to
this effect in June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because
I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp. The
NSDD, including even its indentifying number, is classified.
7. CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure
that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to
avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war. Pursuant to the secred NSDD, the United
States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis
with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military
intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third
country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military
weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational
advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat. For example,
in 1986, President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling
him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran. This
message was delivered by Vice President Bush who communicated it to
Egyptian President Mubarak, who in turn passed the message to Saddam
Hussein. Similar strategic operational military advice was passed to
Saddam Hussein through various meetings with European and Middle Eastern
heads of state. I authored Bush's talking points for the 1986 meeting
with Mubarak and personally attended numerous meetings with European and
Middle East heads of state where the strategic operational advice was
communicated.
8. I personally attended meetings in which CIA Director Casey or
CIA Deputy Director Gates noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons
such as cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators in order to stave off the
Iranian attacks. When I joined the NSC staff in early 1982, CIA Director
Casey was adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect "force multiplier"
that would allow the Iraqis to defend against the "human waves" of Iranian
attackers. I recorded those comments in the minutes of National Security
Planning Group ("NSPG") meetings in which Casey or Gates participated.
9. The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director
Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin
military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq. My notes, memoranda
and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew
of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military
weapons, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.
10. The United States was anxious to have other countries supply
assistance to Iraq. For example, in 1984, the Israelis concluded that
Iran was more dangerous than Iraq to Israel's existence due to the growing
Iranian influence and presence in Lebanon. The Israelis approached the
United States in a meeting in Jerusalem that I attended with Donald
Rumsfeld. Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the
United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq.
The United States agreed. I travelled wtih Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was
present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz about Israel's offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the
Israelis' letter to Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that
he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so.
11. One of the reasons that the United States refused to license
or sell U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was that the supply of non-U.S. origin
weapons to Iraq was sufficient to meet Iraq's needs. Under CIA DIrector
Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA made sure that non-U.S.
manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq the weapons needed by Iraq.
In certain instances where a key component in a weapon was not readily
available, the highest levels of the United States government decided to
make the component available, directly or indirectly, to Iraq. I
specifically recall that the provision of anti-armor penetrators to Iraq
was a case in point. The United States made a policy decision to supply
penetrators to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC
files will contain references to the Iraqis' need for anti-armor
penetrators and the decision to provide penetrators to Iraq.
12. Most of the Iraqi's military hardware was of Soviet origin.
Regular United States or NATO ammunition and spare parts could not be used
in this Soviet weaponry.
13. The United States and the CIA maintained a program known as
the 'Bear Spares" program whereby the United States made sure that spare
parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weaponry were available to
countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for
defense needs. If the "Bear Spares" were manufactured outside the United
States, then the United States could arrange for the provision of these
weapons to a third country without direct involvement. Israel, for
example, had a very large stockpile of Soviet weaponry and ammunition
captured during its various wars. At the suggestion of the United States,
the Israelis would transfer the spare parts and weapons to third countries
or insurgent movements (such as the Afghan rebels and the Contras).
Similarly, Egypt manufactured weapons and spare parts from Soviet designs
and porvided these weapons and ammunition to the Iraqis and other
countries. Egypt also served as a supplier for the Bear Spares program.
The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's manufacturing
capabilities. The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's
sale of weaponry, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.
14. The mere request to a third party to carry out an action did
not constitute a "covert action," and, accordingly, required no
Presidential Finding or reporting to Congress. The supply of Cardoen
cluster bombs, which were fitted for use on Soviet, French and NATO
aircraft, was a mere extension fo the United States policy of assisting
Iraq through all legal means in order to avoid an Iranian victory.
15. My NSC files are currently held in trhe President Ronald
Reagan Presidential Archives in Simi Valley, California. My files will
contain my notes and memoranda from meetings I attended with CIA director
Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates which included discussions of Cardoen's
manufacture and sale of cluster bombs to Iraq. My NSC files will also
contain cable traffic among various United States agencies, embassies and
other parties relating to Cardoen and his sale of cluster bombs and other
munitions to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states.
16. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA
authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of
cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq. My NSC files will contain
documents that show or tend to show the CIA's authorization, approval and
assistance of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other
muntions to Iraq.
17. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents
that will show that the highest levels fo the United States government,
including the NSC Staff and the CIA, were well aware of Cardoen's arrest
in 1983 in Miami in a sting operation relating to the smuggling of night
vision goggles to Cuba and Libya. My files will also show that the
highest levels of the government were aware of the arrest and conviction
of two of Cardoen's employees and his company Industrias Cardoen.
18. CIA Director William Casey, aware of Cardoen's arrest and the
conviction of his employees and his company, intervened in order to make
sure that Cardoen was able to supply cluster bombs to Iraq. Specifically,
CIA Director Casey directed the Secretaries of the State and Commerce
Departments that the necessary licenses required by Cardoen were not to be
denied. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents
showing or tending to show that CIA Director William Casey's intervention
was in order to maintain Cardoen's ability to supply cluster bombs and
other munitions to Iraq.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct to the best of my memory and recollection.
Executed on 1/31/95
Howard Teicher (signature appears on original)
(end of document)